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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The Utah Petroleum Association, Utah Mining Association, Utah Taxpayers 
Association, and Utah Farm Bureau ( collectively "Associations"), by and through 
counsel of record, hereby jointly file this amici curiae brief in the above captioned matter 
to request the Court to avoid placing precedential language into an opinion that would 
require either the Utah State Tax Commission (hereinafter "Tax Commission" or 
"Commission") or the counties to uniformly find and value undeveloped mineral reserves 
for purposes of applying a property tax. 
Pursuant to Rule 24(i) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, the Associations 
have reviewed and adopt the arguments raised in the amicus brief filed by the Utah State 
Tax Commission ("Commission Amicus Brief') - including the arguments that (1) the 
Utah Constitution and statutes prohibit the taxation of undeveloped mineral reserves, and 
(2) property taxes have not historically been imposed on undeveloped mineral reserves in 
Utah. In the instant brief, the Associations raise additional arguments specific to 
Association members that were not raised by the Tax Commission as follows: 
1. Authority to assess all minerals is limited to the Tax Commission under 
case law, and both the uniform and equal provision and the fair market value provision of 
the Utah Constitution, thus precluding county assessment of any minerals. 
2. Public policy implications militate against assessing and taxing 
undeveloped reserves because such would either lead to forfeiture of undeveloped 
mineral reserves by owners unable to immediately develop them or force premature 
I 
development of some mineral reserves in potentially unfavorable market conditions. 
Further, the assessment of undeveloped mineral reserves is by its nature very imprecise, 
speculative and changing, potentially infringing upon the uniformity requirement of the 
Utah Constitution. 
3. Any change in assessment practices of undeveloped minerals would first 
require a constitutional amendment and appropriations by the Utah Legislature. 
I. 
ARGUMENT 
THE TAX COMMISSION IS THE SOLE ENTITY IN UTAH WITH 
AUTHORITY TO ASSESS MINERAL RESERVES FOR PURPOSES OF 
APPL YING A PROPERTY TAX AND IT MAINTAINS THAT 
AUTHORITY EVEN IF NOT AX IS IMPOSED FOR LACK OF VALUE 
OR UNIFORMITY. 
The Associations have reviewed and agree with all of the Commission Amicus 
Brief, including section LB. In section LB., the Tax Commission notes that "if a mineral 
reserve is to be taxed directly, it can only be assessed by the Commission, and if a 
.-tJ mineral reserve is undeveloped, it is not directly taxable by any entity." The Commission 
then adds legal support for this principle by citing to the Tax Commission's constitutional 
authority under Art. XIII, section 6 to "assess mines," and to Utah Code section 59-2-
102(24), (27) which defines mines. The Associations agree that this legal authority 
supports the stated principle, and also hereby provide the Court with additional legal 
_d) support for this principle. 
In Kennecott Corp. v. Salt Lake County, 702 P .2d 451, 457 (Utah 1985), the Utah 
Supreme Court held that only the Tax Commission can assess mines. The Court held that 
because the Utah Constitution provides that only the Tax Commission can assess mines, 
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"the Legislature is without power to confer the power of assessing mines ... on ... the 
district courts." Like the Legislature and courts, counties similarly have no constitutional 
authority to assess or tax mines. 
There is also additional legal support for the principle that "if a mineral reserve is 
to be taxed directly, it can only be assessed by the Commission, and if a mineral reserve 
is undeveloped, it is not directly taxable by any entity." See Commission Amicus Brief, 
at section LB. This support is found in Utah Constitution Article XIII, section 2(1), 
which provides that "all tangible property in the State ... shall be ... assessed at a 
uniform and equal rate in proportion to its fair market value." (Emphasis added). Insofar 
as a mineral reserve does not have value, it is not taxable, and insofar as it does have 
value it can only be assessed by the Tax Commission. Thus, pursuant to Article XIII, 
section 2( 1) of the Utah Constitution, counties are precluded from taxing undeveloped 
reserves because property without identifiable market value is not taxable by either the 
Commission or the counties. 
Moreover, where this fair market value clause and/or the uniform and equal clause 
(also in Art XIII,§ 2(1)) preclude the assessment and taxation of undeveloped mineral 
reserves, as is the case here, this does not mean the Tax Commission loses and the 
counties gain the authority to assess and tax undeveloped mineral reserves. Undeveloped 
mineral reserves with unknown quantity or quality still fall under the Tax Commission 
jurisdiction for assessment under Article XIII, section 6 of the Utah Constitution, even 
though the Commission does not assess them. 
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II. TAXING UNDEVELOPED RESERVES WOULD CREATE POOR PUBLIC 
POLICY. 
Assessing and taxing undeveloped reserves would create poor public policy. 
Much of the privately held land with undeveloped reserves is owned by farmers and 
ranchers who would likely have no cash flow with which to pay the property tax on 
reserves that are sitting idly in the ground. Constitutional requirements of uniformity 
would mandate that these property owners pay taxes on undeveloped reserves, forcing 
some to sever their mineral rights at a great discount due to the uncertainty, sell their 
entire property, enter into unfavorable leases, or lose their property as a result of inability 
to pay taxes assessed on the undeveloped mineral reserves. 
Further, imposing a tax on undeveloped reserves may well drive many mineral 
producers from the state or incentivize them to act contrary to the market. Mineral 
producers who hold property for future development are not likely to continue to hold 
undeveloped mineral interests if they are forced to pay a tax bill with no income to offset 
the taxes. In addition, owners of undeveloped mineral interests may choose to accelerate 
production or mining efforts to generate income to pay taxes (rather than lose their 
property at a tax sale) and will find themselves at odds with market cycles, as well as 
environmental, agricultural, and other community interests. Also, if the producers release 
their leasehold interests, the individual landowners will then bear the burden of paying 
taxes on mineral property even though they do not have the means to extract the minerals 
nor related income stream to pay the taxes. 
Imposing a tax on undeveloped reserves would also place a tremendous burden on 
the Tax Commission and the taxpayers of Utah, with little to no potential benefit, as few 
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if any undeveloped reserves have value. Utah has maintained a wise historical course by 
not taxing undeveloped reserves. This historical practice should continue. 
To try to tax all undeveloped reserves on a uniform basis is impractical because 
constitutional and statutory mandates would require the Commission to find and 
uniformly value all of the copper, oil, gas, salt, etc. under the land of every farmer, 
rancher, and other landowner in Utah. See Utah Constitution Article XIII, section 2(1 ). 
This would place a substantial burden on the farmers, ranchers, mining companies and oil 
and gas companies in Utah, and is simply not feasible, for several reasons. 
First, the Tax Commission would have to hire engineers, geologists and 
geophysicists to try to find the minerals and make the necessary valuation determinations. 
Even then, determining value would be a speculative guessing game, if there was any 
value at all. Reserves are generally undeveloped precisely because, under current 
circumstances, it is not economical to develop those reserves. See Commission Amicus 
Brief, at section I.A. 
Second, oil and gas are "fugitive resources" which often migrate, grow and/ or 
shrink. Oil and gas "have no fixed situs under a particular portion of the earth's surface 
within the area where they obtain." Ohio Oil Co. v. Indiana, 177 U.S. 90, 202 (1900). 
"They have the power, as it were, of self-transmission." Id. It is impractical to uniformly 
value undeveloped oil and gas reserves that often move and change. 
Third, until drilling occurs, the quality of the oil or gas cannot be ascertained -
whether sweet or sour. Sweet oil or gas can be sold directly from the wellhead, whereas 
sour oil or gas requires extensive treatment before it can be sold and may have no value 
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in its natural state. See Union Oil Co. v. Utah State Tax Comm 'n, 2009 UT 78 ,r,r 4, 5, 
and 10, 222 P.3d 1158, 1160-61. It is impractical to uniformly assess a value to a product 
of unknown quality. 
Fourth, estimates and values of reserves are uncertain and are impacted by 
changes in technology, regulation, conservation efforts, and fluctuating prices. 
Improvement to hydraulic fracturing methods combined with horizontal drilling have 
opened up new reserves of oil and gas in shale formations. Exhibit A (see heading titled 
"Hydraulic Fracturing"). New York State's ban on hydraulic fracturing in the state of 
New York, although not affecting Utah, is an example of how regulation severely 
diminishes the recoverability oil and gas reserves. See Exhibit B. Further, conservation 
efforts impact resource recovery as demonstrated by a proposal introduced in 2014 which 
would set aside nearly 83,000 acres in Utah and Colorado to protect a pair of rare 
flowering plants found only on lands overlaying oil shale formations in Utah and 
Colorado, changing the economics of oil production. Exhibit C. Finally, huge 
fluctuations in oil, gas and other mineral prices affect the value of the reserves and 
determine whether companies will attempt to remove minerals from the earth. Exhibit D 
("Sharp declines in new production are evident in high-cost plays, while growth in some 
low-cost unconventional production appears virtually unaffected."). 
For all of these reasons, it is simply not feasible for the Tax Commission to try to 
uniformly find and value all undeveloped reserves consistent with the requirements of the 
Utah Constitution and statutes. 
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III. ANY TAX ON UNDEVELOPED RESERVES SHOULD BE IMPOSED 
THROUGH A CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT AND/OR 
LEGISLATION. 
Undeveloped reserves have not historically been taxed in Utah and, if they are to 
be taxed, it should be done through ( 1) a constitutional amendment which removes the 
uniformity clause, or (2) legislation whereby the legislature can appropriate funds to the 
Tax Commission to hire the geologists and engineers necessary to uniformly locate and 
value all undeveloped reserves in the state. An enormous undertaking would be required 
to value the entire state's undeveloped mineral reserves. Many budget and appropriations 
actions and policies would be required. The people of Utah and, thereafter, the 
Legislature should thus change the policy if it is to be changed. 
CONCLUSION 
The issue of whether undeveloped mineral reserves are taxable is important to the 
Associations and has significant ramifications. The Associations thus respectfully 
request that this Court avoid putting any precedential language in its opinion that would 
suggest that undeveloped reserves are taxable under the law, or would otherwise require 
the Tax Commission as a matter of law to start uniformly locating and valuing all 
undeveloped reserves. 
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High-tech US oil producers need $80 per barrel to be profitable. Saudis need only $50. 
Oil Price Fall Threatens US Oil Production BysTeve 
AUSTIN for OIL-PRICE.NET, 2014/11/04 
A fall ing oil price is good for the US consumer and good for the US economy. Transport costs 
feed into the price of every physical product, so if oil gets cheaper, everything gets cheaper. If 
the oil price falls too far, however, the USA's recent fracking boom will come to an end. Forces 
are at play to end the USA's projected energy independence and return the country to 
dependence on the Middle East for its fuel supplies. The USA's long-term key supplier, Saudi 
Arabia, doesn't want to lose grip on its best customer. 
Recession 
Falling factory output in China and the onset of recession in Europe means that a continued fall 
in the demand for crude oil is inevitable. The recent return to production of Algeria , Libya, Iraq 
and Iran means that the world is already oversupplied with crude oil. The astonishing rise of 
production by hydraulic fracturing in the USA means that America is increasingly self-sufficient 
in oil. When supply exceeds demand a fall in the price of any product is inevitable. 
When a market is over supplied, prices continue falling until enough suppliers are forced into 
bankruptcy to reduce supply to the level of demand. At that point, prices can start to rise again. 
This is the classic explanation of the causes of recession and recovery. However, the oil 
market is different. Lead times and start up costs are high in the industry and so production 
cannot just be turned on and turned off at will. Oil has a global sales price but location-
dependent variations in production costs. Middle eastern producers responded to the 
peculiarities of the oil economic cycle by forming OPEC to limit supply in times of economic 
decline and support the price of oil. By controlling supply levels and sharing out the cuts 
between them, the 12 nation club can ensure that none of the producers have to go bust 
before supply and demand return to equilibrium. 
Return to Market 
The recent return of production by Algeria and Libya put pressure on OPEC's oil quotas. Both 
these recovering countries are OPEC members and so their sudden return to the market 
means that the club now exceeds its self imposed limit of 30 million barrels per day. The 
inevitable fall in the price of crude oil, caused by over supply, should have sent the members to 
the conference table for an emergency quota-slashing meeting. However, key members of 
OPEC fell silent, and stuck to the planned meeting schedule, meaning the group will not meet 
until November to talk about limiting output. 
OPEC has no power to impose its quotas and so if the member states do not want to abide by 
them, there is little anyone can do about it. The group's stated limit of 30 million barrels per day 
would still see the market in over supply. Any quota-busting production spells disaster for the 
price of crude oil. 
Policy Change 
Saudi Arabia is by far the largest producer in OPEC, although on a global scale, their output is 
exceeded by Russia. It has always been in Saudi Arabia's interests to keep the price of oil 
high. This is because, despite decades of wealth, the county hasn't managed to produce any 
other industry that could sustain the levels of state spending to which the country has grown 
accustomed. Saudi Arabia uses the threat of reduced production and high oil prices to give it a 
very power voice in world politics and it is particularly adept at co-opting American military 
might to its pet causes. 
Suddenly, Saudi Arabia seems to have switched its policy. It increased its production in 
September 2014 and not only fails to support the current price but seems to be actively pricing 
its sales to drag the global price of oil down. The country is now selling at a price lower than the 
level it needs to maintain state spending. It is dipping into reserves to enable it to undercut its 
rivals. The OPEC alliance has split and old rivalries in the Middle East are driving the current 
fall in oil prices. 
Hydraulic Fracturing 
The techniques behind hydraulic fracturing have been around since the 1930s. However, 
refinement of the process and its application to shale in the late 1990s made the process a 
commercially viable method of oil extraction. As the technique developed and was combined 
with horizontal extraction methods, hydraulic fracturing, or "fracking" created exponential 
growth in US oil production. By 2010, the success of tracking had removed the need for the 
USA to import gas and US companies skilled in the technique began to spread across the 
world looking for earning opportunities in other countries. Large shale oil basins were 
discovered across the globe and US businesses looked set to reap the rewards of their 
expertise by dominating oil production by this technique. 
Oil Price 
In a perfect market, unhindered by politics, cartels or special interests, the price of a product is 
the only mediator between its demand and its supply. When demand for oil exceeds supply, its 
price rises, making extraction from inhospitable locations, like the Arctic tundra or offshore 
platforms, economically viable. More of the world's oil becomes profitable and so more is 
extract by extending production to previously unprofitable locations. Output rises to meet 
demand and the price stabilizes. If supply exceeds demand then the price falls. If the price falls 
far enough, and stays low long enough for those extractors in high-cost locations to go bust, 
excess production will be squeezed out of the market and the price will rise again. 
The expansion of tracking in the United States has contributed to over-supply. Fracking is only 
viable at a certain oil price level, so, in many ways, by forcing over-production, hydraulic 
fracturing oil producers have contributed to their own problems. Investments were made in low-
margin extraction and loans were secured to finance them, based on the convention that no 
matter how much oil the US produced, price levels would be maintained by OPEC cutting 
production. Financiers did not have to worry about the dangers of supply and demand because 
OPEC would ensure price stability. 
New Normal 
Saudi Arabia has put its foot down. In the face of triumphalist crowing about energy 
independence in North America the country has turned to the classic economic model of price 
being determined by the equilibrium between supply and demand. Not only are they not 
reducing their prices! they are actually cutting them. They are not lowering production levels, 
they are increasing them. The Kingdom has large cash reserves and they seem to be prepared 
to coast on their savings for as long as it takes for their competitors to go out of business. 
Fracking is vulnerable and will not survive a price drop unless the US oil industry reorganizes. 
Challenges 
Thanks to financing costs, new hydraulic fracturing sites are unlikely to be opened up if oil 
stays at less than $90 per barrel for any length of time. Each extraction project is different and 
incurs different plant investment costs, returning different profit margins. The banking industry, 
however, works on a blanket level of a need for $80 per barrel for a project to turn a profit. The 
extra $10 is needed to ensure the banks get paid back. 
However, some shale oil regions, such as the Eagle Ford Shale and Permian Basin in Texas 
can still turn a profit selling at $53 per barrel. The problems faced when assessing any new 
shale oil project include distance to distribution points, local availability of accommodation, the 
capacity of the transport network and availability and price of expertise and staff. These factors 
can make crude oil cheaper to deliver from Texas or North Dakota to refineries on the East 
Coast, or it can make Saudi oil, arriving by tanker, cheaper than domestically produced oil. 
Solution 
Hydraulic fracturing became a viable business in the US because of a rising oil price and also 
because of falling production costs. Necessity is the mother of invention and it should not be 
assumed that the industry will not continue to develop cheaper methods and equipment. The 
shale oil producers have been living high on the hog with a gold rush mentality, spraying cash 
in all the communities into which they move. Therefore! there is a lot of fat to trim to bring 
inception and operation costs down. High payments to property owners for drilling access are 
probably soon to be dramatically reduced, building schools and community facilities are 
expensive public relations exercise that may not happen again. 
Supported by technology and aggressive cost cutting, the US shale extraction oil producers 
can continue to expand their share of the market. Pipeline projects to distribute domestic oil to 
US refineries would lower delivery costs and further reduce the price disadvantages of shale 
oil. US producers need to be smart and act quickly, however, the Saudi Arabia Oil Policies and 
@ 
@ 
Strategic Expectations Center recently revealed that the Kingdom is prepared to go as low as 
$50 per barrel, which would be a tough price to match. 
© oil-price.net 2009, all rights reserved. 
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BloombergBusiness 
N.Y. Officially Bans Fracking With 
Release of Seven-Year Study 
.... .. . .................................................................................................................. __ _ 
Freeman Klopott June"i9, 2015 - 1:16 PM MDT Ne;;··v ork state has offi~i~ii;··b~~d··h;&~~li~···fr~~~~~~·· .......................................................................... . 
The state, following through on a decision Democratic Governor Andrew Cuomo made in December, 
released its formal study of the drilling practice Monday after almost seven years of study. The report, 
which drew the same conclusions as a shorter version released Dec. 17, said studies on fracking's effects 
on water, air and soil are inconsistent, incomplete and raise too many red flags. 
"After years of exhaustive research and examination of the science and facts, prohibiting high-volume 
hydraulic fracturing is the only reasonable alternative," Joe Martens, commissioner of the 
Environmental Conservation Department, said in a statement. 
Parts ofNew York sit atop the gas-rich Marcellus shale formation, and Cuomo had been trying to 
balance the prospects for the economic development seen in Ohio and Pennsylvania against 
environmentalists' warnings that fracking might taint water and make farmland unusable. 
The balancing act ended in December with Cuomo's decision to follow the advice of the health 
department and ban the practice. The move was hailed by environmentalists and derided in the 
economically depressed Southern Tier region. 
Before it's here, it's on the Bloomberg Terminal. 
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Deseret Nevvs 
Protections for flowering Uinta Basin plants 
will cost $3 million 
May 6, 2014 
SALT LAKE CITY - A federal proposal to set aside nearly 83,000 acres in Utah and Colorado to 
~ protect a pair of rare flowering plants will cost nearly $3 million in a single year, mostly to 
traditional oil and gas producers. 
The U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service released a draft economic analysis on the impacts of 
designating critical habitat for the Graham's beardtongue and White River beardtongue, which 
~ are only found in the oil shale formation in Utah and Colorado. 
A draft conservation proposal, which drew sharp criticism from the Southern Utah Wilderness 
Alliance, is being pursued as a possibility because the agency said the plants would not receive 
the benefit of voluntary protections already in place under an Endangered Species Act listing. 
"Under the ESA, plants do not receive protection on private lands unless there is a federal 
nexus, 11 the agency said. 11Therefore, the service is engaging private landowners in voluntary 
efforts for these two species. This is especially important for the White River beardtongue since 
almost half of its distribution occurs on private lands." 
The Graham's beardtongue in Duchesne and Uintah counties would receive protections under a 
proposal by the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service to set up critical habitat and implement 
"pollination" zones. It would cost energy developers nearly $3 million in the first year, should 
the restrictions go into place. (Kevin Megown, U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service) 
A public hearing will be held in Vernal May 28 at the Uintah County Library on the proposed 
protections for Uintah and Duchesne counties in Utah, and Rio Blanco County in Colorado. 
11 From our end, the (plants) are threatened on all sides by encroaching oil and gas and now oil 
shale development," said Steve Bloch, attorney with the Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance. 
11This is just the latest of missteps by the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service. We are hugely 
disappointed that the Fish and Wildlife Service after 10 years of dithering is working against the 
betterment of this species." 
According to the proposal, Graham's beardtongue, which sports vivid pink flowers, would be 
protected on 67,959 acres that would include "pollinator" zones to ensure its continued 
survival. 
The plant grows only in a 80-mile horseshoe bend on oil shale strata. Oil shale development, 
the agency estimates, would impact 82 percent of the plant's population, while all energy 
development poses a risk to 91 percent of the plants, according to a draft environmental 
analysis. 
Photograph of White River beardtongue. A draft study on the economic impacts of federal 
protection zones for a pair of flowering plants found in the Uinta Basin puts costs to traditional 
energy development at nearly $3 million in the first year. A public hearing is set in Vernal May 
28. (U.S. Fish and Wildlife Services) 
For the White River beardtongue, the service is proposing 14,940 acres of land to be set aside 
for protections. Energy development, the service estimates, would impact 100 percent of the 
plant. 
Energy development, the service contends, would "likely lead to severe declines," in both 
species if protective action isn't taken. 
The analysis estimates the bulk of the costs that would come from the establishment of 
protection zones would be borne by traditional oil and gas producers - $2. 7 million in the first 
year. Costs to grazing would be $9,000. 
A potential oil shale project that would overlap with federal lands would incur costs estimated 
at $130,000, according to the federal analysis. 
The study notes that a "substantial" portion of the proposed critical habitat for the plant falls 
within federal lease areas in Utah and Colorado for oil shale and tar sands. For the Graham's 
beardtongue, 66 percent of its population is on Bureau of Land Management acreage, while 39 
percent of the White River beardtongue grows on BLM land. 
Kathleen Sgamma, vice president of governmental affairs for the Western Energy Alliance, said 
the federal government is proposing an action that is unwarranted using an analysis that 
greatly downplays the economic ramifications. 
"This is a good example of how the Endangered Species Act is being used to stop energy 
development as opposed to really protecting an endangered species." 
Sgamma said the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service has wrongly taken an overall species of plant 
that widely occurs throughout the area and segregated it into two subgroups to make a case for 
federal protections. 
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Introduction 
Emerging data on U.S. oil drilling and output show that U.S. shale producers appear to 
be among the first to respond to the collapse in global crude oil prices. Sharp declines 
in new production are evident in high-cost plays, while growth in some low-cost 
unconventional production appears virtually unaffected. 
Oil prices shed around half of their value between June and December 2014, falling 
precipitously after OPEC's November decision to maintain constant oil production. Saudi 
oil minister Ali al-Nairni declared that OPEC would defend its share of global crude 
oil markets from upstart producers, including U.S. shale operators. Two months later, 
OPEC's actions appear to be generating the desired effect. New oil production in some 
U.S. shale plays appears to have been curtailed, especially since November. Signs include 
shrinking numbers of drilling rigs in operation, fewer wells being drilled, and reductions 
in the volumes of new oil production corning onstrearn. 
The clearest evidence of decline has emerged from the Permian Basin of Texas and New 
Mexico. There were steep drop-offs in the number of rigs in operation and in the drilling 
of vertical wells. As a result, projected new oil flow, especially from vertically drilled 
wells, has decreased. 
The picture is far from universal, however, and important counter-cases bear mention. 
Perhaps the most contrarian is South Texas' Eagle Ford shale, where data from the 
Austin -based analytics firm Drillinginfo show rising numbers of wells drilled and 
increasing volumes of oil produced, even between the months of November 2014 and 
January 2015, as bad news spread across the global oil sector. 
It bears emphasizing that the slowdown in growth, where it applies, does not mean that 
overall U.S. oil production has decreased. It means that production growth is occurring at 
a decreasing rate. 
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Significance 
The Drillinginfo data appear to confirm speculation that some of the first reductions in 
worldwide oil production would take place in the U.S. shale sector. The shale industry 
is now revealing itself as a nimble and price-responsive producer at a time when OPEC 
member-states have refused to squelch their own production, thereby rejecting their 
customary market-balancing role. The International Energy Agency (IEA) expects other 
high-cost producers such as Canada and Colombia to join in the cuts in production, but 
investment momentum and price hedging often mean that oil output continues to rise in 
the near term.1 The U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA) forecasts that overall 
U.S. oil production will increase until the third quarter of 2015 for similar reasons. 2 
Long-planned conventional projects, including those offshore, continue to bring new 
production online. 
A number of analysts predicted that market dynamics would force shale producers to 
assume a portion of the swing producer role formerly held by Saudi Arabia. 3 As is now 
well known, OPEC members announced at their Nov. 27 meeting that member-states 
would maintain a constant level of production, refusing to reduce oil flowing to an 
oversupplied global market. The drop in oil prices accelerated immediately after Nov. 27 
( see Figure 1). 
Figure 1. West Texas Intermediate spot price 
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Al-Naimi blamed rising non-OPEC production for OPEC's divergence from past practices, 
arguing that any OPEC cut would be quickly annulled by production increases from 
emerging competitors. 
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"Why did we decide not to reduce production? I will tell you why," al- Naimi said in 
December. "If I reduce, what happens to my market share? The price will go up and the 
Russians, the Brazilians, U.S. shale oil producers will take my share. "4 
To date, however, there has been little quantitative evidence of a non-OPEC supply 
response. Anecdotal reports have described declining investment, job cuts, and dropping 
numbers of drilling rigs in operation. Missing from these reports were figures detailing 
numbers of actual wells drilled, whether levels of new oil production had declined, and, if 
so, which basins bore the brunt of those declines. This paper intends to bridge that gap by 
leveraging previously unreleased data provided by Drillinginfo that sheds light on these 
important shortcomings. 
The Drillinginfo index reveals reduced investment in some shale formations-both in 
terms of number of wells and the overall production potential of these investments-and 
opposite effects in others. What emerges is an illustration of the diverging fortunes of an 
industry that appears to be shifting into a low-price mode in which retrenching firms set 
aside drilling plans in less-productive zones and focus efforts on their most productive 
acreage and highest efficiency extraction techniques. These revelations portend a new 
paradigm in an industry where decades-long investment horizons have typically led to 
over- or under-shooting market needs, contributing to price volatility. 
The enhanced price-responsiveness of shale extends from a key difference with 
conventional oil exploration and production, in which shale resembles a manufacturing 
process. Exploration is generally unnecessary because locations of oil-rich shale basins 
are already known. However, constant levels of production require constant rates of well 
drilling, due to steep decline curves on well productivity. If drilling declines, production 
tends to follow. 
Methodology 
We combined two primary sources of data to tell this story. First, we were given access to 
previously unreleased monthly data from Drillinginfo, a company that compiles diverse 
ground-level data on oil and gas production. Second, we examined those data alongside 
rig count data from Baker Hughes, which has been a standard data source for analysts 
tracking industry investment trends. 
The Drillinginfo index tracks new onshore wells that have been drilled ("spudded") 
across most of the lower 48 U.S. states since March 1, 2014. 5 The index assigns each well 
a predicted peak production volume, which is calculated as the average peak production 
of nearby wells of a similar type. The index is computed on a monthly basis, and wells are 
tracked down to precise latitude and longitudes. Thus, the index provides an indication 
of the level of investment and drilling activity at a precise geographical location, as well as 
a useful estimate of expected initial production. These data are provided for the previous 
calendar month, a shorter time frame than those of other public reports. 
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It is important to interpret the Drillinginf o production index carefully. The index 
estimates the maximum monthly new oil production likely to flow from a given well 
drilled in a given month. The data do not show when or whether the wells are completed 
or connected to gathering infrastructure. Peak production normally occurs at least 
a month after the well and its production are counted in the index. Further, new 
production covered in the index is a fraction of overall U.S. oil production. The index 
captures a future marginal increase in total production from new wells. Thus, even if the 
index showed zero new production for January, production could still continue to rise as 
wells drilled earlier in the year come online. 
Our second data source, the rig count data from Baker Hughes, details the number of 
rigs "actively exploring for or developing oil or natural gas" on a weekly basis in each 
U.S. county. The dataset tags each rig as horizontal or vertical (an indicator of whether 
the well is unconventional or conventional) as well as whether the well is targeting oil or 
natural gas. The data are similar to the DI Index in that they provide an indicator: of the 
level of new upstream investment. 
Rig counts fail to capture productivity differences in terms of number of wells drilled or 
expected volumes of production from those wells. However, the Baker Hughes rig count 
is available for a longer time horizon (since early 2011). Changes in the rate of upstream 
investment will appear sooner in Baker Hughes' weekly rig counts than in the monthly 
Drillinginfo index. 
Five Places Where Production is Dropping 
National 
Across the continental United States, data from Drillinginf o show a gradual 13% decline in 
new oil production brought onstream in a given month, from about 600,000 barrels per day 
(bbl/ d) in May 2014 to just under 525,000 bbl/din January 2015. Although new production 
rises and falls throughout the period, it appears significant that levels in January-after falling 
oil prices became a concern-are the lowest of any of the months shown. 
New oil-directed6 well starts showed greater declines, dropping by 32%, from 1,967 
in May to 1,338 in January. Oil drilling dropped by the largest amount, 24 % , between 
December and January, as oil prices hit their lowest levels. 
Geographically, the biggest declines appear to be affecting North Dakota's Bakken formation, 
while in technological terms, the largest declines concerned vertically drilled wells. 
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Figure 2. New U.S. liquids production from all wells drilled in the month 
indicated, by well trajectory 
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Figure 3. New U.S. oil wells drilled in the month indicated, by well trajectory 
2,000 -
1,500 -
-0 
~ 
{5 1,000 -
!!!. 
I 
500 -
0-
I 
Jun 
I 
Aug 
I 
Oct 
Source: Dril/inginfo; Scaled to compensate for number of days in month. 
I 
Dec 
Trajectory 
Vertical 
Horizontal 
7 
Rice University's Baker Institute for Public Policy • Center for Energy Studies 
Figure 4. Active oil-directed rigs in the month indicated, by well trajectory 
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Figure 5. New U.S. liquids production from wells drilled in the month 
indicated, by formation 
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Permian Basin 
Among the major U.S. oil formations, the clearest signs of price-influenced changes 
in production are seen in the Permian Basin, where, after evidence of a long surge in 
investment and vertical and horizontal drilling since 2011, new production was down 
by almost 16% between May 2014 and the end of January 2015. However, the decline in 
predicted peak production appears to be tied mainly to a reduced number of vertical 
wells. New production from vertical wells plummeted by 46%, from 36,000 bbl/din 
May 2014 to just under 20,000 bbl/din January 2015. The steepest fall-off coincides 
with the OPEC announcement in late November. Predicted production of about 30,000 
bbl/din December tumbled by 36% to just under 20,000 bbl/din January. Many of these 
vertical wells are in the eastern Permian's Midland Basin where production is linked to 
vertical "infill" wells drilled in mature fields. Vertical infill wells are relatively simple and 
inexpensive to drill, which allows producers to pull back production when prices drop. 
For horizontal wells in the Permian, which are more heavily concentrated in its western 
Delaware Basin, the case is different. Drillinginfo data show predicted new production 
remaining relatively constant from May through January at roughly 125,500 bbl/ d. In 
fact, there was virtually no change in new production from horizontal wells between 
November-prior to the oil sector lapsing into panic mode-and January, well after that 
period was underway. 
Another strong indicator of producers reacting to falling oil prices came in the form of 
a sharp increase in the average productivity of horizontal wells in the Permian, which 
jumped by 11 %, from an average of 458 bbl/ d per well in December to 507 bbl/din 
January. Rising well productivity conforms to expectations that firms would shift away 
from low-producing wells in non-core areas and concentrate on drilling horizontal 
wells in their most productive acreage. The Drillinginfo data appear to bear out these 
predictions. 
Finally, the Baker Hughes rig count data corroborates these findings. Rigs drilling oil-
directed vertical wells in the Permian declined from a peak of 385 in June 2012-well 
before the current slump in global oil prices-to a low of 122 at the end of January 2015. 
Figure 6 below shows a steep rig decline after the November OPEC meeting, illustrated by 
the vertical dotted line on the right-hand side. The rig count for horizontal drillers also 
shows a decline, albeit a smaller one. After reaching a peak of 349 on December 5 {where 
it stayed until January 2), rig counts fall to 328 by the end of January 2015. 
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Figure 6. Rig-count in Permian Basin, by well trajectory 
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Figure 7. New Permian Basin liquids production from wells drilled in the 
month indicated, by well trajectory 
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Figure 8. New Permian Basin oil wells drilled in the month indicated, by well 
trajectory 
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Decreases in oil production and drilling frequency are also in evidence in some smaller 
and lesser-known tight oil plays, as well as areas that lie outside the geographical 
boundaries of the major shale formations. Though the decline in activity has been sharp, 
these plays represent a smaller segment of upstream investment in terms of oil-directed 
wells (34% of national for May 2014 to January 2015), rig counts (44% of national for the 
same time period), and predicted peak production (19% of national). Thus, the aggregate 
impact of investment declines here will be minor at a national level. Again, this finding 
is consistent with predictions that production would be maintained in core basins and 
acreage where high flow rates and other factors allowed for lower unit costs. Forecasts 
likewise suggested that drilling and production would fall in non-core areas where higher 
break- even prices were needed to support continued investment and extraction. 
Four areas in particular underwent sharp declines in both new wells drilled and new oil 
production, Drillinginfo data show. Those were the Eaglebine formation in East Texas, the 
Mississippian Lime formation in Kansas and Oklahoma, the Granite Wash in Oklahoma 
and Texas , and areas denoted on the figures below by "other," which include locations 
outside of defined formations. Combined, these four areas saw new oil production drop 
by 33% between May 2014 and January 2015, with a pronounced 29% drop from 108,000 
bbl/din December to just under 77,000 bbl/ d in January. 
Slipping new production coincides with a declining well count. The number of oil-
directed wells drilled in these four areas shrank from 676 in May to 336 in January, which 
includes a 44 % drop between December and January. 
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Figure 9. New liquids production in smaller plays from wells drilled in the 
month indicated, by play 
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Figure 10. New oil wells in minor plays drilled in the month indicated, by play 
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The Bakken Formation 
The story in the Bakken Formation, concentrated in North Dakota and spilling into 
Montana and southern Saskatchewan, is more equivocal. Data from Drillinginfo show 
predicted production dropping by 18% from around 123,000 bbl/din May to around 
101,000 bbl/din January. However, new oil production brought onstream actually crept 
upward in November and then slipped modestly afterward. 
Similarly, total wells drilled in the Bakken declined from 215 in May to 185 in January, 
with the largest drop (-122) occurring in April 2014. This period comes well before falling 
oil prices began to sour the investment climate in the oil patch. Declines in drilling and 
new production have been more modest since November. 
Baker Hughes' rig count data show a less dramatic drop in oil-directed rigs operating 
in the Bakken during most of 2014, with numbers holding steady at just under 200 and 
then dropping from 190 (November 26) to 146 on January 30 after the November 27 
OPEC decision. 
The North Dakota Department of Mineral Resources' January report also describes an 
atmosphere of continuing decreases in the number of operating rigs and well completions, 
which fell from 145 in October to an estimated 39 in November. "Oil price is by far the 
biggest driver behind the slowdown," the report states. "Operators report postponing 
completion work to avoid high initial oil production at very low prices ... "7 
Figure 11. New Bakken liquids production from wells drilled in the month 
indicated, by county 
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Figure 12. New Bakken oil wells drilled in the month indicated, by county 
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Figure 13. All active rigs in the Bakken, by county 
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Outside of U.S. shale plays, another casualty of declining oil prices emerged in the heavy oil 
operation in and around Kern County and Bakersfield, California. Drillinginfo data show 
that new production in Kern County fell from just under 2,700 bbl/din May to 400 bbl/d by 
January. The biggest monthly declines occurred in December (40%) and January (another 
83%). New heavy oil production in Fresno County, never large, also slowed significantly, 
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while that of Los Angeles County producers tracked by the company appears to have 
stopped altogether. Drillinginfo's production data parallels a similar decline in the number 
of wells drilled, which fell to 16 in January from 113 in November; Baker Hughes' data 
reveal a similar idling of rigs in the California heavy oil patch (see Figure 16). Besides halting 
production, plunging global oil prices also lie behind a financial crisis in Kern County, 
which declared a fiscal emergency in January. 8 The national impact of this decline will 
be relatively minor. Total new oil production brought onstream in a given month is over 
500,000 bbl/d for the nation, but California's share tops out less than 1 ¾ of this. 
Figure 14. New California liquids production from wells drilled in the month 
indicated, by county 
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Figure 15. New California oil wells drilled in the month indicated, by county 
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Figure 16. Active oil-directed California rigs , by county 
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As mentioned above, the declining new production in some areas contrasts with flat or 
increasing output from other formations. In addition to western areas of the Permian 
Basin, regions managing to resist the downward pressure include the Eagle Ford and 
Niobrara formations. 
Eagle Ford Formation 
The Eagle Ford shale of South Texas was always advantaged by its close proximity to 
transport infrastructure and demand centers, including the Gulf Coast refinery sector. 
Drillinginfo predicts that new oil production actually increased in the formation, surging 
even during the worst hit months of December and January, when other regions were 
beginning to pare back. New oil wells9 in the Eagle Ford jumped from 220 in November 
to 260 in January, while predicted production from these wells rose from about 133,000 
bbl/din November to about 159,000 bbl/din January. It was unclear from the data 
whether this increase was a reaction to price signals or a more random event in a basin 
where new monthly production has risen and fallen over the short term, while remaining 
roughly constant since May.10 Baker Hughes' rig data show a contrasting picture, with 
oil-directed rigs in operation declining immediately after the OPEC meeting in late 
November, from a 2014 high of 214 to 161 by January 30.11 Rig departures could be a sign of 
a coming decline in oil production in the Eagle Ford. 
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Figure 17. New Eagle Ford liquids production from oil wells drilled in the 
month indicated, by county 
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Figure 18. New Eagle Ford oil wells drilled in the month indicated, by county 
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Figure 19. Active oil-directed rigs in the Eagle Ford, by county 
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In Colorado's Niobrara chalk formation, predicted production and drilling frequency 
have remained relatively constant since May, including during the November-to-January 
period of steep declines in the oil price. Most of the activity in what Drillinginfo defines as 
the Niobrara has taken place in Weld County, northeast of Denver. 
Figure 20. New Niobrara liquids production from horizontal oil wells drilled in 
the month indicated, by county 
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Figure 21. New Niobrara horizontal oil wells drilled in the month indicated, 
by county 
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There are solid economic reasons why North American light tight oil (LTO) is well suited 
to become a new source of "swing supply" in the global oil market. However, economic 
rationale also provides reasons why decreases in production might not be as rapid as one 
might expect, particularly in the most prolific areas. 
LTO is relatively high-cost in comparison to most conventional global oil production, as 
shown in the plot below.11 Standard economic theory predicts that when prices decline , 
the high-cost suppliers of a good or service are the first to halt production as price dips 
below their cost. 
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Figure 22. Global oil supply curve 
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In the short-run, shale oil production should be able to respond in a much more elastic 
manner to price changes than large, conventional projects. These typically require years 
of planning and irreversible capital expenditures. Once these fixed costs are sunk, the 
firm's interests are best served by proceeding with production. For example, oil sands 
production in Canada, typically more expensive than LTO on a per-barrel basis , is less 
responsive to price fluctuations once investment costs are sunk. 
Similarly, big startup investments may be accompanied by large shutdown costs, such as 
in deepwater offshore production. In these cases financial models typically require steady 
production volumes for many years, and often take into consideration short-term price 
volatility. By contrast, LTO investments are smaller and faster to execute. Low barriers 
to entry allowed small, independent producers to rapidly move into the market and start 
drilling. The same low barriers allow them to exit quickly if investing becomes unprofitable. 
Finally, shale wells are also characterized by steep decline curves. Hydrocarbons flow 
at high initial rates but tail off rapidly. Thus, revenues are earned within a much shorter 
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time frame. This means the profitability of a project is more dependent on favorable 
current prices. Steep decline rates also mean that any halt to drilling implies a fast ~op-
off in production. In contrast, conventional wells tend to decline much more slowly, 
so a halt in conventional drilling takes much longer to show up in reduced production 
volumes. 
There are also economic reasons why LTO production may respond more slowly than 
expected. 
Markets for oilfield services and land are both very competitive, with costs dropping as 
producers drill fewer wells. This is particularly true in "gold rush" areas where supply of 
these inputs during the boom was constrained and prices were bid up. With lower costs, 
some producers may still be profitable and stay in business despite lower oil prices. 
Also, some firms have hedged production or sold volumes in forward markets, which 
insulates them against price drops and requires that they keep drilling to fulfill these 
commitments. Likewise, some producers may have already executed procurement plans 
for upcoming investments. If they have already paid for work ( or it is costly to cancel the 
contracts), it may be most profitable to keep drilling. 
Lease terms, which typically specify limited periods for initial drilling, provide another 
incentive to produce irrespective of price. However, once hydrocarbons are discovered 
in commercially viable quantities, mineral rights typically become "held by production" 
in perpetuity. The firm can return at a later date to drill additional wells once prices rise. 
Signs of such behavior include an increase in average rig transit time between wells as 
firms focus less on maximizing production and more on holding onto leases. 
Finally, wells drilled in different regions of a formation may produce different quantities 
of oil. Wells in "sweet spots" might be profitable in a low price environment, while wells 
in less prolific areas are not. We should expect firms to cut their most profitable projects 
last. Since these "sweet spots" generally produce the highest volumes of oil, the fall in 
production should be smaller than the fall in the number of wells drilled. In other words, 
as prices drop average productivity per well should rise. 
Conclusion 
The picture of U.S. oil production responding to lower prices was just beginning to clarify 
as this paper was written. What is depicted here is an early snapshot of an industry 
making initial adjustments in response to a new economic environment. 
This paper synergizes a compilation of quantitative evidence from multiple sources that, 
taken together, suggest that U.S. oil production, and in particular, that of shale oil, will be 
an early responder to the large drop in oil prices that occurred in late 2014. 
Although the actual changes in output are modest, the implications are not. The swing 
producer role held by Saudi Arabia since the mid- l 970s appears to be in flux. At times 
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when the Saudis decline to adjust production in line with market signals, such as at 
present, that role may revert to higher-cost areas of production, including some in the 
United States. In fact, the swing producer role was once an American concern, overseen 
by the Texas Railroad Commission, which, until the rise of OPEC, maintained similar 
production quotas aimed at reducing oil price volatility. 
This time, however, the response is not being orchestrated by a governing body but by 
the decentralized actions of many firms responding to price signals. In the case of shale, 
unique characteristics allow this to happen. These include higher costs, short lead times 
for investment, low barriers to entry and exit, steep production decline curves, and 
requirements for continuous drilling to maintain constant production. 
U.S. shale will probably be unable, by itself, to assume the mantle of global swing supplier. 
For one thing, American crude tends to serve domestic markets; producers are prohibited 
by law from exporting U.S. crude oil. For another, rapid declines in some shales and in 
vertical drilling contrast with more gradual reductions in the most profitable plays. The 
Baker Hughes rig counts do show the emergence of a steep, downward trend at the end of 
January for a number of the big plays, but the average monthly production estimates from 
Drillinginfo do not. These core areas- the Bakken, the Eagle Ford, the Permian Basin, 
and the Niobrara-make up the lion's share of new oil production. Since the wells that 
are drilled will be generally more productive, production should not decline as much as 
investment. 
Shale's price responsiveness bodes well for big conventional oil producers and projects, 
including those outside North America, which, due to lengthy investment-to-production 
timelines, cannot respond as quickly. Shale's short-term investment characteristics 
might also help reduce the duration of the current oil bust, in contrast with the nearly 
two decades of low oil prices between the mid-1980s and early 2000s, which were 
exacerbated by the onset of huge projects in Alaska, the North Sea, and the Gulf of Mexico 
that were not as responsive to oil prices. 
The low barriers to entry, which allowed small companies and investors to quickly move 
into the shale oil business, appear to be complemented by low barriers to exit, which 
allow them to move away when prices reverse. If OPEC and Saudi Arabia shift away from 
their prior swing producer roles, the nimble characteristics of U.S. shale producers may 
provide global markets with alternate and useful source of spare capacity. 
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